In the name of God

An Entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol



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
Introduction

- Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
 - one of the most successful application of quantum information theory
 - its security is based on laws of quantum mechanics, not based on the complexity of factoring integers
- BB84 protocol
 - most well-known QKD
 - Bennett and Brassard in 1984
- In this paper, a novel QKD protocol is presented
 - which has advantages over BB84



QKD Scnario

- Alice communicates with Bob via a guantum channel
- They discuss results using a public classical channel
 - allows them to verify that the key has not been intercepted
- Eavesdropper
 - tamper with the quantum channel
 - listen to the classical channel
- Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
- Intercept-resend attack
 - Eve intercepts each qubit sent by Alice, measures the qubit state and resends to Bob the result of her measurement



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Proposed Protocol

Alice and Bob publicly agree on two 2-qubit unitary transformations

$$\begin{array}{ll} U_1 = & \text{CPHASE} \ (I \otimes H) \ \text{CNOT} \ (H \otimes I), \\ U_2 = & \text{(CPHASE)}' (I \otimes H) \ \text{CNOT} \ (H \otimes I), \end{array}$$

where

CPHASE =
$$I \otimes |00\rangle + \text{PHASE} \otimes |11\rangle$$
,
(CPHASE)' = $I \otimes |00\rangle + (\text{PHASE})' \otimes |11\rangle$,
PHASE = $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & i \end{pmatrix}$,
(PHASE)' = $\begin{pmatrix} i & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$.

• These two unitary transformations generate entanglement

Alice

- generates a number of random bits divided in groups of 2: $a = a_1 a_2$
- prepares $|\Phi\rangle = |a_1 a_2\rangle$ and applies randomly one of the unitaries
- transmits the two qubits one at a time
 - waiting for Bob to acknowledge the reception of the previous qubit
 - prevents Eve from perfectly undoing the transformation
- discloses her choice of transformation



Bob

- undoes the transformation by applying U_1^{\dagger} or U_2^{\dagger}
- measures the qubits in the computational basis
- obtains the raw key bits



Eavesdropping Phase

- Alice randomly selects one qubit of each group
 - discloses them on a public channel to compare with Bob measurement result
- If more than a predetermined number of bits disagree
 - abort the protocol and start over
- Otherwise they share secret keys

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Figure of Merit (F)

- Eve wants to maximize her information of Alice's key with the minimum increase in QBER.
- The amount of knowledge that Eve obtains about Alice's bit sequence
 - quantified by Shannon's mutual information

$$I(A,E) = H(A) + H(E) - H(A,E)$$

 \Rightarrow F=I(A,E)/QBER

- BB84:
 - -I(A,E)=1/2
 - QBER=1/4 => F=2
- Proposed protocol
 - is analyzed in three cases

- Eve measures both qubits in the Z basis
 - Our analysis shows that I(A,E)=0 and $QBER=1/2 \Rightarrow F=0$.
- Eve measures only one qubit in each pair in an arbitrary basis
 - This is equivalent to allowing Eve to apply arbitrary gates to one qubit and then measure the qubit in the Z basis
- Genetic algorithm is used to find Eve's optimum transformation

$$U = \begin{pmatrix} 0.3846i & 0.9041 - 0.1863i \\ -0.9231 & 0.0776 + 0.3767i \end{pmatrix}$$
$$F_1 = \frac{0.204}{0.391} = 0.5217$$

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- Eve measures both qubits in a pair in an arbitrary basis
 - This is equivalent to allowing Eve to apply arbitrary gates to each qubit and then measure both qubits in the Z basis.
- Genetic algorithm is used to find Eve's optimum transformations

$$U_{e_1} = \begin{pmatrix} -0.8664 & -0.4994 \\ -0.4994 & 0.8664 \end{pmatrix},$$

$$U_{e_2} = \begin{pmatrix} -0.5547 & 0.3379 - 0.7603i \\ -0.8321 & -0.2253 + 0.5069i \end{pmatrix}.$$

$$F_2 = \frac{0.265}{0.43} = 0.6162$$

Comparison with BB84

Protocol	I(A,E)/QBER (F)
BB84	F = 2
	$F_1 = 0.5217$
Our protocol	$F_2 = 0.6162$

 Value of metric F is decreased by a factor of 3.83 and by the factor of 3.24 when Eve measures one and both of qubits of each group

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Conclusion

- A novel QKD protocol that utilizes entanglement to provide advantage against eavesdropper
- The metric *F*, of the proposed protocol is better than that of BB84.
- Our protocol is easily extendable to N>2
 - Alice and Bob agree on two N-qubit transformations.
 - Alice applies one of these transformations to an Ntuple of qubits
 - In the checking phase, half of qubits of each group are disclosed